CSDP 20 years on: 7 ideas to strengthen EU military crisis management
Credit: EUTM Somalia
Introduction
This year marks the 10th year anniversary since the creation of the European External Actions Service (EEAS) in 2011. The European Union's diplomatic service includes among its many tasks also the complex one related to EU crisis management. I focus here on the question of EU military crisis management through the lense of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), offering a reflection on some recommendations with a view to making the EU a more effective security actor as the EEAS enters its second decade of service in the “post-Lisbon” era.
Premise:
The launching of 11 CSDP military missions and operations since 2003 has been a quintessential learning ground for the EU and has made joint European peace-keeping and peace-building a reality. From a historical perspective, such a development should be acknowledged as a major achievement, as it represents a trend of slow yet increasing military integration. In spite of the EU’s overall positive role as a force for stabilisation in crisis scenarios, as I have analysed in my Master’s Degree thesis, certain shortfalls continue to prevent it from fully realising its potential. If the EU wants to increase its impact and projection as a security actor abroad, it must work to consolidate an institutional as well as operative military and defense framework that provides effective communitarian solutions. Here are 7 ideas the EU could enhance its effectiveness:
1. Identifying common threats in a strategic perspective
The EU cannot afford to unnecessarily delay requests for intervention where and if its strategic interests and international credibility are at stake. The EU needs to reflect on how to reinforce its readiness to take action in a politically cohesive manner that displays strong European engagement. This begins with developing capabilities in early threat analysis and common perception of crises through better intelligence gathering and greater information sharing for consequent political deliberations. Today, the EU’s intelligence service (EU INTCEN) is limited to what Member States want and can share. In this direction, the decision reached by the EU defense ministers in June 2020 on developing the ‘Strategic Compass’ as a tool to identify common threats shared by Member States can be a sound basis to foster a common strategic culture. Understanding and sharing common assessments of which international developments constitute security threats for the EU would allow decision-makers to determine earlier the kind of action that is warranted in a crisis scenario.
2. Modifying unanimity voting rules at Council level for the CFSP
The presence of the unanimity rule, implying a need to have full consensus among 27 member states to ‘greenlight’ CSDP missions at Council level, hampers the rapidity of the decision-making process at the political-strategic level. Member States have used time and time again their political ‘veto power’ to block the launching of certain missions and operations, as most recently shown by Operation Irini. Extending the qualified majority voting system in the Council also in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters would offer theoretically one solution, although it would be legally difficult (as it would imply re-writing treaty provisions) and politically improbable to achieve in the short-term. A form of ‘unanimity with constructive abstention’ could be more at hand by allowing Member States to express their political sentitivities without creating generalised impasses that lead to compromises and ultimately diluted solutions.
3. Creating an EU Headquarters…
At the military-strategic level the EU should truly develop a standing Command and Control structure that would allow it to conduct military operations in a more centralised and autonomous manner. The development of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) in 2017 is a concrete step in the direction of creating a european military HQ, but as it stands today it can only shoulder EU (non-executive) training missions while it should instead also act for EU (executive) operations. Centralising military command structures at EU level will take considerable political efforts, especially considering the presence of parallel NATO structures. However, existing and demonstrably effective military structures like EUROCORPS, that have shown their importance in facilitating the EU military deployment in the Central African Republic, could be further integrated to become a rapid response multinational force under the CSDP.
4. Enhancing the Integrated Approach and strengthening partnerships
As the EU enters the second decade of CSDP operations and missions, the planning of future ones should take on by default an ‘Integrated Approach’ (read more on it here) as the challenges presented today require far greater civil and military synergies especially if governance of fragile states wants to be improved. The process of creating regional action plans for CSDP in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel show that the EEAS has espoused a logic of regionalisation of crisis management in a manner that should be directed at tackling the root causes of the conflict. This course of action is promising but it merits to be fostered together with the United Nations and NATO by contemplating the formation of a new institutional architecture for security and defence partnerships to ensure more structured synergies with international partners.
5. Investing and Coordinating together on European made capabilities
The EU cannot aspire to take on more important military endeavours if it lacks financial or logistical means to do so. While EU military missions and operations tend to be relatively well financed, especially if we look at the latest ramp up of funding for EUTM Mali for training local armed forces, budgeting expenses for military missions and operations remains the responsibility of single Member States and are not covered in the EU budget – contrary to civilian CSDP. Creating a common budget for such military expenditures in their entirety would allow for greater burden sharing and pooling of resources.
It must be acknowledged however that the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period has introduced an element of novelty, namely by introducing a budgeting section dedicated to security and defence. The MFF will now also finance the European Defence Fund (EDF) for EUR 7 billion. The EDF instrument will lay the foundations for a more structural form of military-industrial cooperation among EU member states by covering costs for military and defence capability developments. This would help the EU in achieving a key pillar of its “strategic autonomy” which is in part grounded in the ability of acting autonomously with its own set of capabilities. Along these lines, the newly created Directorate-General for Defence industry and Space (DG DEFIS) can play an essential role if it promotes EU cooperation in the production of a common set of defence capabilities that avoids duplication, costing EUR 26 billion a year according to a seminal study of the EPRS.
6. Increasing force elements and providing common training
The EU should also re-enforce the amount of force elements that it deploys in missions and operations since some missions tend to be understaffed, as mentioned in a European Parliament report from 2019, which prevent EU staff from cementing relationships with host nation armed forces staff, as the SIPRI has also recently illustrated. This will only occur if there is a shift in mentality underpinned by a logic of ‘return on investments’ whereby the use of more troops for the stabilization of crisis areas “today will require less troops tomorrow”. More EU troops does not necessarily mean more performative ones, however. Common standardized training and education to develop forces that are interoperable will be a key prerequisite for any improved permanent structured cooperation in the future. This will require the full usage of technologies to digitally connect forces and capabilities and let them train and prepare together, not only during the actual pre-deployment phase, but permanently and on all levels (from tactical to strategic).
7. Creating more robust assistance measures for host states
If the EU wants to put partner countries in the condition of adequately countering terrorist threats, it must provide them with better and more modern military assets since the poor logistical equipment of host government armed forces impairs their own operational capability. The recent approval by the Council of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as an “off-budget” instrument worth EUR 5 billion would, if executed correctly, will be crucial in allowing the EU to support partner military forces by directly funding their peacekeeping or capacity building activities and it could provide them with military equipment, infrastructure and material. This would fill a gap in current EU military support and signals a shift away from the EU’s traditional focus on soft power tools. One can also not forget the element linked to international development that is needed to complement stabilisation gains. Indeed, the recent endorsement of the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) worth EUR 79.5 billion will allocate part of its funds to support Capacity Building for Security and Development (CSBD), which would strengthen the nexus between security and development in third countries.
Conclusion
This decade will be a crucial one for European security. As we have come to know, the EU is built on ‘small steps’ - ‘l’Europe des petits pas’ to echo the founding fathers Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. My feeling is that after years of stall, the EU is slowly but steadily moving in the direction of creating a truly common European security and defence Policy that would represent the most significant step for the completion of the European political integration project. Only through a more effective EU abroad can it better protect our security interests and promote its values. The EU should feel more encouraged than ever to express this on a global stage as we are confronted with growing challenges.
