The Abraham Accords: Potential, Achievements and Challenges one year on.
The Abraham Accords of September 2020 were a defining moment in the international politics of that year. One year on, it is increasingly questionable if such Accords can live up to the expectations of delivering a “Peace Process” in the Middle East, as they were originally set out to do. While its proponents have referred to them as being a watershed moment for Middle Eastern politics, others have downplayed and even admonished their role in accentuating tensions in the region. The truth, according to my analysis, should be found some way in between. While on the one hand the Abraham Accords have delivered tangible results to the parties that have undersigned the Accords on a political, economic and cultural level, the Abraham Accords lack a regional inclusiveness which casts doubts on their capacity of delivering durable peace in the Middle East and resolving deep-seeded problems.
The Abraham Accords refer to the joint statements between the State of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America. Subsequently, the term was used to refer to agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Such Accords were part of a foreign policy initiative in the context of the former Trump administration’s policy to normalise the bilateral relations of Israel with Arab states. The lack of the multilateral dimension to the Accords, circumscribes their potential to the parties which are signatories.
As to the merits of the Abraham Accords, from a historical and political perspective, they can be lauded for having been the first public normalisation of relations between an Arab country and Israel since that of Jordan in 1994. Beyond the political dimension, the Abraham Accords have also created a framework to deepen the economic ties of the states involved. The latest mutual investments between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain in high tech industries including artificial intelligence, defence, and other areas underscore the important amplification of economic ties. At a cultural level too, the roll-out of first exchange programme among universities and the opening of tourism in the Gulf countries to Israeli tourist is undoubtedly a positive factor from a human and commercial perspective. The Abraham Accords have also had a positive “spill over” effect in other Arab countries like Morocco and Sudan, where we have also seen an expanded normalisation of relations via agreements signed with Israel.
As to the challenges of the Accords, there are two main ones.
Firstly, it is clear that the continued implementation of the Accords will depend greatly on the constant action of the United States in acting as a guarantor and mediator between the State of Israel and Arab countries. This could be clearly seen in the case of Morocco insofar as its adherence to normalising relations with Israel came after the US’s declaration to recognise the disputed territory of Western Sahara in favour of the Kingdom of Morocco. In the case of the UAE, the reasons are more linked to favorable arms sales of the US to the Emirate. With the arrival of the Biden administration, it is increasingly evident that the US does not share the same regional vision and this seriously undermines the road traced by the Abraham Accords under the Trump administration. However, it is well possible that friendly relations among the parties of Abraham Accords can continue on an interest-driven basis.
Secondly, the Accords – which were intended to act as a cornerstone of a Middle East “Peace Plan” – fell short of being accepted by key Arab players like the Palestinian Authority. Despite being offered concessions, Palestine’s denouncement of the Accords has bred further grievances between Israel and Palestine which later even degenerated into armed violence. The fact of the matter is that missing from the process was a pragmatic vision of how the Palestinian question could be advanced as a primary part of the Accords, rather than a secondary one.
In conclusion, the Abraham Accords have been one of the major, although perhaps today less noticed, policy initiatives led by the United States in the Middle East in the last decades. In many respects, it has borne fruits by creating a framework for the rapprochement among important regional actors. Going forward, the viability of the Accords will depend greatly on the way in which the political and economic commitments that underlie the Accords are upheld, and this in turn will depend greatly on the actions of the changed political leadership in both the US and Israel.
